Another Response To: Do the “Doctrines of Grace” Affect Evangelism?


This is another response from the previous blogger. This is the last response to my article Do the Doctrines of Grace Affect Evangelism?published on SBCToday 4/6/2014. The article is published here on my blog May 26, 2014 as well.

You said, “It seems that most of the comments are in a reaction to how I can believe that God unconditional elects some individuals (and not others) yet also genuinely desires salvation for all people. This isn’t exegetical schizophrenia or inconsistent with Calvinism. What is not ok, is to say that my view is not consistent with Calvinism, when it has been a consistent view of some Calvinist throughout church history.”

I am not saying that it has not been the view of some Calvinists, but rather it is inconsistent with the essentials of Calvinism as defined by Calvinists, e.g. compatibilism, unconditional election, selective efficacious calling, and limited atonement. Any one of these concepts (as defined by Calvinists) absolutely and inviolably precludes even the remotest possibility of one member of the non-elect being saved. To wit, if God willed (volitional act) for the non-elect to be the elect (according to Calvinism), they would be. They are not for the same reason.

I am quite unable to grasp the consistency between God inviolably willing for something to be eternally so while concomitantly inviolably willing that it not be eternally so. This is quite different from God commanding something and allowing disobedience since they are not mutually exclusive or contradictory ideas and both fall under His one eternal will. God’s will is to allow evil and overcome evil with good; this is in contrast to the two contradictory will scenario wherein God is actually willing the opposite of what He is willing. We are not trying to be unkind to you, but this kind of talk is unacceptable. What God wills happens, but two wills means that something God wills to happen will not happen because He willed it not to happen. I do not believe any linguistical maneuvering can make sense out of God willing to happen what He willed not to happen.

You said, “The most compelling evidence for the two wills of God is in the death of Jesus Christ. The most compelling example of God’s willing for sin to come to pass while at the same time disapproving the sin is his willing the death of his perfect, divine Son.”

First, this is not compelling at all. As a matter of fact, I do not see two wills of God in this passage, but rather I see one will which comprehends and overcomes the misuse of choice by man and Satan. To wit, God is sovereign. Maybe I do not see two wills there because it is not there. Moreover, I do not need to see it there. I think some Calvinists see it there based upon a need rather than sound observation or exegesis. Yes, man’s act was evil, and Satan’s act was evil; however, such freedom was comprehended in the one will of God. God sending His Son to die for our sins was not evil, nor was it evil for God to allow sin and to overpower the evil of man, man meant it for evil, but God for good. This fits perfectly with a sovereign God creating man with freedom of choice, knowing man would use it for evil and God would overcome it by good. As you well know, for God to be truly sovereign, not even the evil of man is beyond His power. If this is indeed the strongest case for God having two wills that are in absolute irreconcilable contradiction, I find such to be quite telling regarding the weakness of the argument. Without trying to explain Calvinism’s conundrum, no one would see or need to see such contradictory volitional acts within God.

On a personal level, it is this kind of double talk that I find unacceptable (I am familiar with Piper’s work). It is the quintessence of what I call double talk, which is a rhetorical practice exercised by some Calvinists in order to soften the harsh realities inherent in Calvinism. Only within Calvinism does there need to be such a serious effort to postulate the notion that God wills (volitionally acts) to inviolably guarantee that what He wills (volitionally acts) does not happen.

This for me is the fatal quest of Calvinism. It seeks to answer the difficult questions by answers that inevitably lead to superimpositions (sadness over someone rejecting gospel when God predetermined it, two opposing wills, good faith offer, determinism, etc.) upon the clear and simple straightforward truths of Scripture. According to compatibilism, one is free so long as he acts according to his greatest desire. Does God have such a desire a will that wins out between these two or is this an eternal conflict? If it is not an eternal conflict within God, then one will, desire, does win out. I suspect you believe (unless you believe there is an unresolved conflict of wills in God) that is His secret will (Calvinism); therefore, we are back to where we started and all such talk of God desiring the non-elect to be saved, in any eternally meaningful sense, is double talk. How does this fit with God having a compatible nature, or do you believe He possesses otherwise choice? In addition, this seems to diminish God’s nature because He has a will that fights (and wins) against His revealed will. Imagine a man holding a gun to your head and telling you how much he secretly wills for you to live while he is pulling the trigger to assure that reality does not come to pass. That is possible, but we would not see it as noble. Moreover, the retreat to the two will option declares that God’s message to the world is not true, and you have done nothing to assuage that conclusion.

I can say it no better than David Engelsma, a strong Calvinist, when he says of this position and the Calvinists who retreat to mystery here “that God is gracious only to some in predestination, but gracious to all in the gospel, and that God wills only some to be saved in predestination but wills all to be saved by the gospel, is flat, irreconcilable contradiction. It is not paradox, but contradiction. I speak reverently: God Himself cannot reconcile these teachings.”[1]

 


[1] D. Engelsma, “Is Denial of the ‘Well-Meant Offer’ Hyper-Calvinism?,” available online at http://www.prca.org/pamphlets/pamphlet_35.html; accessed Oct 23, 2008 , quoted in Allen and Lemke, Whosoever Will, 147.

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Ronnie W. Rogers