Calvinists are deterministic in the compatible style.[1] All determinists argue that events happen because they were determined to happen in the way they happened. Events, including salvation, result from God’s determined plan; therefore, salvation cannot be conditioned on a person’s exercising libertarian faith. In this article, I use Calvinism to refer specifically to Calvinists, and I will also use it synecdochically (encompassing all compatible perspectives on moral freedom). I use the term Extensivism for my perspective in both a narrow and a broad sense. In this article, I use it in the broad sense, which includes those typically referred to as non-Calvinist.
Arguing for determinism, the Thomist Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange wrote, “The singling out of one from another must finally be sought not in the human will, but in God who singles out one from another by His Grace.”[2] He cites such verses as 1 Corinthians 4:7, Romans 9:15, and Philippians 2:14.[3]
He specifically engages the issue of libertarian free choice in his argument against Molinism. He provides a good example of how determinists argue against libertarian freedom in general and related to salvation in particular. Garrigou-Lagrange says, “Let us suppose that Peter and Judas situated in equal circumstances receive equal prevenient grace; then God sees Peter consenting to accept that grace, and hence singling himself out from Judas who does not consent, not on account of the grace, for an equal grace is indifferently offered to each. Therefore it is because the will decides to accept the grace. Thus do all Thomists argue against Molina, and they thus affirm as revealed the principle that can be called ‘the principle of predilection,’ namely, that no one would be better than another unless he were loved more and helped more by God.'”[4] Here are my thoughts on his comments according to my understanding of Scripture.
- The principle of predilection highlights Calvinism’s and other deterministic perspectives’ commitment to the deterministic inequality of God’s love and grace (Peter could not have made a better choice without God providing him more love and grace than Judas). It also equates being better than another with making a better decision. As Calvinists see it, if Peter exercises his will to believe, he is better than Judas because he made a better decision. But that is not actually true. Simply making a better choice does not necessarily mean or demonstrate that the person making it is essentially better than someone else; it only shows that the choice is better. Humans are essentially equal (Gen 1:26–27), even the ones who make bad decisions.
According to libertarian freedom, Peter is not saved because he is a better person, even though he made a better choice; this is precisely the nature of libertarian beings—choosing among accessible options, some of which are better or worse than others. Sometimes, the better person, non-essentially speaking, may actually make a worse choice than his less noble counterpart within a given range of options. For example, we see this when an atheist or thief may make a better choice than a Christian in the context of a particular choice, range of options, or an equivalent opportunity. This does not entail that the atheist, a person without God in his life, is better than the Christian in whom God dwells. Once Peter makes the better choice, the consequences of salvation do clearly make Peter an essentially better person, but obviously, that is only because of grace.
Therefore, according to Extensivism, both the choice and the betterment resulting from the choice are due to the grace of God.[5] To wit, no aspect of salvation in Extensivism (or human existence, for that matter) happens apart from grace. It is neither necessary nor expected that this fits Calvinism’s and other perspectives’ determinism, only that it fits what we find in Scripture. Thomists (and other determinists) seem unable to conceptualize God’s plan as comprising his equal love and help for everyone, including grace-enabled freedom to choose differently. We should not be surprised to find Calvinism’s exclusivism here, since it pervades Calvinism’s core tenets—unconditional election, limited atonement, and selective regeneration. - Garrigou-Lagrange relates the will to grace differently than seems best. Although he begins his argument by saying there is “equal prevenient grace,” he then seems to move the will to a place that at least appears to be less dependent upon grace. He says, concerning non-deterministic perspectives such as Extensivism, “God sees Peter consenting to accept that grace . . . not on account of the grace . . . Therefore it is because the will decides to accept the grace.” First, I would note it is not the will per se that decides, but the libertarianly endowed Peter and Judas as the efficient causes of their actions, who decide.
Each decides and carries out his decision by exercising his will.
Second, being so constituted to possess libertarian moral freedom is solely a grace act of God in creation and, therefore, not some rogue force operating outside or contrary to the plan and grace of God; it would only seem so in a Calvinistically-determined system.
Third, the ability to exercise their will in choosing is always by grace, regardless of their choice. Peter’s choice to consent was no more a choice provisioned by grace than Judas’s choice not to consent. Each is able to choose differently because it is the will of God that man be able to do so. That is to say, God’s endowment of man with libertarian freedom does not attenuate the need for and presence of grace. Consequently, Garrigou-Lagrange’s issue seems to be with God’s decision to endow man with libertarian freedom. What if God said to him, I chose for the will to work libertarianly rather than deterministically as you teach? Would he say that cannot be? - Garrigou-Lagrange seems to contend that equal grace must result in the same outcome. This seems to presuppose the correctness of determinism, which necessitates a rejection of otherwise choice. Looking at it in reverse, different outcomes necessarily demonstrate either an unequal grace opportunity or that something outside of grace is in play; here, it is the will. It seems he is willing to accept libertarian freedom so long as it means one can only choose a certain action given the same past and opportunity—libertarianism compatibly defined.
This idea is either explicit or implicit in all the arguments against non-determinists I have encountered that contend if salvation is conditioned upon faith, then the person who gets saved is either wiser or more virtuous than the one who does not; therefore, he is saved by a mixture of grace and human merit. If their argument was correct, such could only mean that man receives some of the glory or credit for his salvation. I think the premise that equal grace must result in the same outcome is invalid.
He also appears to presuppose that God’s granting of grace is only given to procure a determined choice rather than the certainty of otherwise choice. That is to say, determinists make the only possible goal of grace a predetermined outcome rather than an outcome resulting from a grace-enabled choice. They simply assume determinism is correct before the conclusion, thereby subtly and unjustifiably superimposing the restraints of determinism upon Extensivism. Garrigou-Lagrange does not demonstrate why grace is so restricted apart from determinism.
It may be cogently argued that equal grace is the raison d’être (reason for being) for otherwise choice resulting in different outcomes, as Extensivism contends. Garrigou-Lagrange says that Peter singling himself out is “not on account of the grace, for an equal grace is indifferently offered to each. Therefore, it is because the will decides to accept the grace.” In this, he presupposes but does not demonstrate that if individuals can exercise their will differently given the same grace, such ability cannot be the result of grace. But there is actually no reason, outside of a deterministic system, why a person’s freedom to will different outcomes cannot be because of grace, as indeed Extensivism argues. He is simply limiting the purpose of grace to ensure a certain outcome, rather than allowing grace, at times, to enable man to create different outcomes. This means that Garrigou-Lagrange’s limitation is not imposed by Scripture, logic, the inability of God, or a deficiency of grace, but rather, determinism’s narrowness precludes such a state of affairs.
He seems to have simply drawn his conclusion that the equal grace did not include the will (technically, the efficient cause) to be able to choose differently within the same grace, which is, in fact, the essence of libertarian freedom. Therefore, he says that the singling out is “not on account of grace” (if libertarian freedom is true). But Extensivism contends that the singling out is precisely because of grace that affords otherwise choice in an equal opportunity. - Garrigou-Lagrange seems to elide the grace permitting Judas’s choice. He notes only Peter’s act of “singling himself out.” Of course, Peter’s choice did single him out, but did not Judas, having the same grace opportunity, single himself out by not consenting to the invitation of the sovereign God? One may easily infer, as I do, that his argument (about how libertarian freedom operates) includes the reality that Judas’s act to reject God was not one of grace; at least, if he does consider it so, it is neither stated nor obvious.
However, I contend that every sin and thought of defiance about or regarding the sovereign that does not lead to instant obliteration from the face of the earth and being hurled into eternal torment is because of grace. One does not so choose and then continue to live because of some intrinsic merit of the person (Rom 2:4; Acts 17:26–31). Libertarian freedom is given and operates only because of and in God’s grace, and it is God’s will that a person exercises his own will. God does not desire man to choose evil, but he does desire man to make an actual choice between accessible options, which happens only in the context of grace. Libertarian freedom entails that different people, given the same opportunity, can make different choices because equal grace does not necessitate equal outcomes. - Garrigou-Lagrange indicates that Calvinism’s compatible and decretal freedom (including various forms of determinism) is all grace. Yet, libertarian freedom cannot be by grace, as though God is incapable of such a feat. Although I do not accept Calvinism nor compatibilism, I believe that if God chose to operate in this manner, it would be by grace; it is not something beyond God’s ability. However, Calvinists seem to find it impossible, or they are unwilling to consider, that the same is true of libertarian freedom.
Maybe because it requires thinking God is not limited to determinism. It is clear to me that whether God endowed man with a compatible free will or a libertarian free will, each would have been designed and given by God. Therefore, each is by God’s grace, including all its entailments. According to compatibilism, the person freely chooses but does not have a choice between two or more accessible options. God decided this by grace. The result of the determined person’s choice is a determined act of the grace-provided will. According to libertarianism, individuals choose between accessible options. God decided this by grace. The result of the non-determined person’s choice is a non-determined act of the grace-provided will.
Garrigou-Lagrange’s portrayal is that if a person can, by an exercise of his will, choose a better outcome than someone else, it demonstrates a greater grace and love from God. This conclusion is true in Calvinism’s determinism, but it is not demonstrated in Scripture, nor is it logically necessary in a non-deterministic approach such as Extensivism. Extensivism contends that Scripture teaches everything is by grace, including libertarian freedom and its entailments.
[1] Compatibilism contends that determinism and moral responsibility (free choice) are compatible; hence the name. Free choice is not attained by lessening the deterministic nature of compatibilism. Rather, it is derived from defining free choice to mean so long as one chooses from his greatest desire, he has made a free choice. Importantly, the greatest desire is determined; consequently, compatibilism provides only a determined free choice.
[2] Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, tr Dom. Bede Rose (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1944), 462. Garrigou-Lagrange was a prominent 20th century neo-Thomist. See also Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence, The Molinist Account, ed. William P. Alston (New York: Cornell University Press), 117.
[3] “Theological Determinism” from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, A Peer-Reviewed Academic Resource, http://www.iep.utm.edu/theo-det/ accessed 1/3/16. See responses to his argument by indeterminists.
[4] Garrigou-Lagrange, One God, 463, quoted by Flint, Divine Providence.
[5] Extensivist is used in the place of non-Calvinist.
